



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

May 4, 2010

MS. LAURA ROTOLO
ACLU OF MASSACHUSETTS
211 CONGRESS STREET
BOSTON, MA 02110

Subject: Records, other than technical standards and requirements, describing information or intelligence that is disclosed through the national information sharing environment or e-Guardian.

FOIPA No. 1141757- 000

Dear Ms. Rotolo:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Table with 3 columns: Section 552, Section 552a, and checkboxes for exemptions (b)(1)-(6), (b)(7)(A)-(F), (b)(8)-(9), (d)(5), (j)(2), (k)(1)-(7).

4 pages were reviewed and 4 pages are being released.

- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:
- referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D Hardy", with a stylized flourish at the end.

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS


SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT



PURPOSE

As a result of 09/11/2001, the FBI has massively intensified its intelligence dissemination effort. The FBI has historically limited its intelligence sharing through established Intelligence Information Reporting channels normally used by the 17-member United States Intelligence Community (USIC). As the leading domestic criminal, counterintelligence and counterterrorism agency, the FBI has adapted its reporting to facilitate the rapid dissemination of its raw intelligence. The Intelligence Information Report (IIR) is the primary vehicle for this dissemination.

The IIR is the standard through which all "raw" or unevaluated intelligence information is shared with national policy makers, the USIC and law enforcement community in support of national intelligence priorities and the needs of law enforcement consumers. These reports are primarily used by analysts and agents, along with other available sources, to identify threats or trends, and produce finished intelligence products for consumers. As a result of this reporting and eventual analysis, national strategies and action may be affected.

A significant benefit to analysts and agents using the IIR as a dissemination tool is the ability to protect the source of the information while providing essential raw intelligence. This information sharing will also enhance the FBI's collection efforts and support the war on terrorism in accordance with national directives:

It is the responsibility of the FBI to share terrorism intelligence and it is mandated by the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, the USA Patriot Act, the Homeland

Security Act of 2002, and the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection.

Historically, counterintelligence and counterterrorism asset reporting primarily fueled the IIR process. However, criminal and cyber source reporting is now being incorporated to broadly share information across all FBI investigative program lines. Intelligence harvested through investigative techniques such as Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Title III overhears, consensual monitoring, physical surveillance, as well as other sophisticated techniques, can also be the basis for raw intelligence disseminated through IIRs.

Intelligence collection is the responsibility of all personnel who investigate or support investigations. These include agents, task force members, language specialists, Intelligence Analysts (IA's), financial analysts and surveillance group members. To facilitate the IIR process, these personnel must become familiar with the National Humint Collection Directives (NHCD's) and the FBI's Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR's) pertinent to the programs and countries they are working. The NHCD's list the exact issues of interest to the USIC and establish parameters for positive or foreign intelligence reporting. The ICR's focus the FBI's intelligence collection efforts and fill intelligence gaps. The aforementioned investigative personnel must be vigilant and identify relevant intelligence derived from asset reporting, intercepts, surveillance observations and information uncovered from other sophisticated technique collection platforms.


Task force members who produce IIRs based on information available to them through their task force assignment should follow the below protocol to process their IIRs.



b2

Your division Field Intelligence Group (FIG) has access to IIRs via the FBI intranet. This access allows designated personnel, with a need to know, the ability to review IIRs produced within your division. It will allow users the ability review IIRs by program or country, and also allow managers to review individual squads' and the division's production as appropriate.

To further facilitate the timely entry and dissemination of information deemed suitable for IIR dissemination, Senior Reports Officer positions have been established within field offices.




b2

All agents or Task Force

Officers identifying information suitable for IIR dissemination should follow the below listed protocol.


PROTOCOL

1. All agents should review every document they produce for intelligence value and consider submitting the information to the FIG for review.
2. All agents should forward documents (ECs, FD-71s, FD 302s, FD 542s) they believe have IIR potential to their division FIG or JTTF IA.

3. 

b2
b7E

4. While the FIG will prepare IIRs, assessments and bulletins using the intelligence you provide, each agent and supervisor is still responsible for preparing Urgent Reports (if necessary) and contacting other divisions, squads, Legats, or agencies to alert appropriate personnel regarding the information.

5. 

b2

6. The IA will draft an IIR on-line, using the FBI Intelligence Information Report Dissemination System (FIDs) and examine the IIR for content, format, and compliance with FBIHQ procedures. The IA will also redact names of US Persons, ensure sources and methods are protected, and correlate the reported information with the FBI's Intelligence Requirements.

7. The IA will e-mail a PDF version of the Draft IIR to the agent and the squad supervisor, with the following message:

"Attached is your draft IIR for review and approval."

8. As part of the review and approval process, it is the agent's responsibility to:
 - a. Ensure that information in the IIR will not jeopardize any sources or methods or adversely affect an ongoing case.
 - b. Have his supervisor review and approve the IIR, or recommend changes.
9. The agent can either accept the draft or request changes. Any changes to the IIR must be coordinated with the squad supervisor. Corrections should be addressed

in an e-mail format to the IA. If no corrections are needed, paragraph 11 applies.

10. If corrections are requested, the IA will make the corrections and e-mail a corrected copy of the IIR to the agent and supervisor for approval.
11. The agent and squad supervisor should e-mail the IA once the IIR is approved. An IIR will not be submitted to FBIHQ without the agent's and supervisor's approval. In exigent circumstances, verbal approvals are acceptable, but must be followed up with a confirmation e-mail.

12. b2

13. b2

14. The agent should then save the renamed text version final IIR to his draft folder.
15. The agent will print copies (one copy for each file referenced in the admin portion of the IIR, and one copy for indexing of the IIR), have his supervisor initial the bottom of the IIR, and forward the IIR to his SST for uploading.

16. b2
b7E

17. b2

b2

b2
b7E